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ABSTRACT 
The integrity of lawyers’ trust accounts has come under scrutiny in the last few 
years. There are strong possibilities of information technology security breaches 
happening within the firms, either accidental or deliberate. The damage caused by 
these security breaches could be extreme. For example, a trust account fund in an 
Australian law firm was misused in a security breach in which Telstra charged 
A$50,000 for phone usage, mainly for ISD calls to Hong Kong. Our study 
involved interviewing principals of ten law companies to find out solicitors’ 
attitudes to computer security and the possibility of breaches of their trust 
accounts. We simultaneously carried out a survey to see if the trends identified in 
our case-studies could be backed up with broader quantitative data. We have also 
conducted in-depth interviews of five trust account regulators from the Law 
society of South Australia to know their view points on security threats on trust 
accounts. An overall finding highlights that law firms were not current with 
technology to combat computer crime, and inadequate access control was a major 
concern in safeguarding account data. Our conclusions revealed the urgent need 
for law firms to adopt security controls, implement information security policies 
and procedures and obtain cooperation from management to communicate these 
policies to staff.. 
Keywords: Information Security, Information Security Management, Computer 
crime, Trust account. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Law firms are no exception to the trend towards computerized information 
infrastructures, particularly because the very nature of their business is collecting 
and storing highly confidential client data. One area of law firm activity which 
has come under intense security is the integrity of trust accounts. Law firms 
operate and maintain trust accounts on behalf of investors or depositors, to be 
used in the trustees’ interests at the trustees’ request. Trust accounts basically hold 
public money. Many incidences of trust account fraud reported over the last two 
decades clearly indicate that trust accounts have been misused and manipulated in 
a range of ways. The following incidents provide some of the best examples of 
trust account vulnerability, and ensuing fraud, in the public domain.   
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? A lawyer in Canada was found guilty in 2000 of failing to account to 
various clients for trust monies totaling C$1,195,201. Between 1996 
and 2000 he transferred the total amount of C$1,871,526 from his 
firm’s trust account (The Law Society of Upper Canada 2005). 
? A lawyer in Toronto, Canada, misappropriated the sum of C$605,000 
from funds he held in trust on behalf of one of his clients (The Law 
Society of Upper Canada, 2005). 
? A solicitor in the United Kingdom stole £1,250,000 from a client over 
ten years. The cash kept in the law firm’s trust account was part of 
compensation received by the client for lifetime care. The client was 
immobilised below the neck and needed full time care. The solicitor 
diverted money from the trust account to his personal account 
(Jenkins, 2008). 
? Three people in Little Rock, United States of America, complained 
that a total of US$732,000 was missing from their accounts. One 
client claimed that US$16,000 was missing; another claimed 
US$250,000 was missing; and a third claimed that US$466,000 was 
missing (Mark, 2004). 
? An employee from a law firm in Adelaide, Australia, was charged 
when A$4,500,000 was discovered missing from a trust fund. The 
employee faced charges of fraud and deception. Forty-two clients had 
money in that trust account. They were devastated and spent much 
time investigating ways of recovering their money (The Australian, 
September 12, 2006 and Sunday Mail, November 12, 2006). 
 
These major incidents of trust account breaches in Australia and around the world 
triggered the need to explore causal factors and possible preventive measures, and 
became the base for our research. The Professional Standards Section of the Law 
Society of South Australia also wanted to examine the overall information 
security procedures in South Australian law firms, and specifically to improve the 
security of the operation of trust accounts. The results and guidelines developed in 
our work have helped them provide advice and training to lawyers in adopting 
effective information security practices. 
1.1 Computer Crime in Law Firms 
Law firms are not exempt from computer crime. According to a report in the 
Lawyer’s Weekly in the United Kingdom (Cooper, 2006), many incidents go 
unreported because law firms are embarrassed to report them. There are strong 
possibilities of IT security breaches happening within the firms, either accidental 
or deliberate. The damage caused by these security breaches could be extreme. 
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For example, a trust account fund in an Australian law firm was misused in a 
security breach in which Telstra charged A$50,000 for phone usage, mainly for 
ISD calls to Hong Kong (Cooper, 2006). 
While examining employee involvement in computer related abuse within a firm, 
Sakurai et al. (2003) observed that organisations are prone to employee fraud 
when effective computer access controls are not in place. Two categories of 
insider threats have been identified: self-motivated, or controlled by an outsider 
(Choo et al, 2007). Insider threats influenced by an outsider pose the greater 
danger to an organisation, as ‘with advances of communication technology, there 
will be more avenues for insiders to leak sensitive documents’ (Choo 2007: 
XVII). A corrupt insider in a law firm could deliberately sell confidential 
information to a competitor; a situation that appears to be increasing. For 
example:  
 
? In a Global State of information Security Study (2007), employees 
within an organisation were considered a major source of information 
security breach. The data shows that in 2006 the rate of insider attack 
was 3 percent. This rose to 48 percent in 2007.  
? Thomson (2008) interviewed 3,596 professionals from the United 
States, United Kingdom, France and Germany and found that in 75 
percent of cases, breaches within companies were caused by inside 
staff. 
 
These examples highlight the fact that a great threat to law firm security arises 
from within the company, whether the employee’s action is malicious or 
inadvertent (Nelson and Simek, 2005). It can be difficult to discover a dishonest 
professional, particularly in a sole practice law firm due to the absence of peer 
supervision. Law firms are at great disadvantage especially when there is no-one 
assigned to supervise the technical infrastructure, especially in the case of small 
firms. 
1.2 Trust Accounts, Security and Fraud 
According to the Australian Legal Practice Act 1996, a trust account needs to be 
created within a legal practice to hold the money which is given or paid to a 
firm/legal practitioner in the course of legal practice, or the money paid for, or on 
behalf of, a person/body other than the firm/practitioner – this includes transit 
cheques or the money given or paid to a firm/legal practitioner for advance 
payment of legal costs. All principals of a practice that handles trust money, 
including sole practitioners, must hold a Practising Certificate which authorises 
them to receive this money. The trust accounts must be held with an authorised 
bank and separate accounts need to be established for the exclusive use of 
particular clients. These accounts are referred to as ‘interest bearing accounts’ and 
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are recorded in the solicitor’s Investment and Securities Register. 
The Australian Financial Transactions Reports Act 1988 requires legal 
practitioners to report cash transactions of A$10,000 or more. The Law Institute 
of the state concerned appoints trust account inspectors who are normally 
qualified accountants/solicitors. Their role is to assist practitioners in maintaining 
a high standard of trust accounting for trust funds through investigation and 
inspection of relevant legal practice records. Legal practitioners are required to 
assist inspectors by producing legal practice records for inspection or copying, 
and by providing any other information the inspector reasonably requests. 
Inspectors can only disclose information acquired in the course of an inspection 
for the purpose of conducting an investigation. Trust monies must be 
distinguished from the practitioner’s own monies relating to the practice, which 
are held in an office account. 
Managing trust accounts within law practices has long been a challenging task 
due to their proneness to misappropriation and mismanagement. In spite of many 
legal requirements on trust deed limits and how trust funds may be invested, there 
have been many instances where the trustees have breached the trust. These 
breaches can be traced from the establishment of the trust accounts. This 
challenge to the trust account has been a constant problem. Some of the serious 
types of mishandling of trust accounts that we noted include: 
? Transferring from trust accounts to solicitors’ own accounts monies 
which are incorrectly believed, or alleged, to be due to the solicitors’ 
professional charges and out of pocket expenses.  
? Investing clients’ money without instructions or contrary to 
instructions.  
? Borrowing money from clients without disclosing that it is for the 
solicitors’ personal use, and without advising the client to obtain 
independent legal advice. (Fourth report on the legal profession, 
1984). 
 
The vulnerability of trust accounts within law practices makes them a fertile 
ground for computer crime, especially insider attack.  Historically, trust accounts 
have been well known for abuse by internal sources such as the lawyers 
themselves or employees working in a law practice. The computerisation of trust 
accounts has increased the potential for computer crime and has added another 
dimension of threat to their safety.  
De Lacerda (2004) believes that trust account violations can happen because 
‘deliberate doers’ are tempted to use/misuse the huge amount in trust or due to 
poor judgment. Trust account operations reflect on a lawyer’s trustworthiness and 
loyalty to the profession. The Supreme Court in the United States of America has 
defined three levels of common culpability in operating trust accounts: 
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1. Commingling, where there is no separate office account and trust 
account. 
2. Conversion, where a lawyer utilises trust money, intending to 
return it. 
3. Misappropriation: the deliberate misuse of funds (De Lacerda, 
2004). 
De Lacerda (2004) reports that one of the administrative staff of a company took 
US$265,000 from the trust account over a five year period and kept the firm’s 
lawyer unaware of complaints from clients. This staff member faked the lawyer’s 
identity and intercepted phone calls.  
Our research has attempted to explore the sources of threat to the security of the 
information systems underpinning the management of trust accounts within law 
firms. Without this understanding, law firms are not in a position to plan a 
systematic strategy to protect their trust accounts from attack.  
1.3 Association of Trust Account Fraud with Money Laundering 
Trust account fraud is also widely associated with money laundering, a type of 
major crime involving financial transactions. Money laundering converts illegal 
money into a legal form, and the criminal enjoys the benefit of it without being 
suspected by police (Anti-Money Laundering Reform Issue Paper 1, 2004). 
Money laundering can be defined as: “to knowingly engage in a financial 
transaction with the proceeds of some unlawful activity with the intent of 
promoting or carrying on that unlawful activity or disguising the nature, location 
source, ownership or control of these proceeds” (Genzman 1997). Thus, money 
laundering transforms unlawful money into a usable form.  The link between 
money laundering and trust accounts is evident. According to Beare (2007) the 
significance of a legal trust account in the context of a money laundering 
operation should not be under estimated; it can be used as part of the initial first 
step in converting the cash proceeds of crime into other less suspicious assets, it 
can serve to help hide criminal ownership of funds. Hence, it is clear that a trust 
account, which is public money, can be misused by criminals as part of the money 
laundering process.  
The problem of money laundering is not limited to a particular state/country or 
profession; it has spread worldwide and across all professions. In the United 
Kingdom, a bank complained about a sole practitioner firm from which a 
fraudster withdrew £260,000 from a customer account, transferred the amount 
into a trust account and then requested the law firm to transfer the money to an 
offshore account (Mark, 2007). Here, responsibility for the mistake was pointed at 
the law firm as it did not check the fraudster’s identity; instead, the firm had 
assisted and facilitated the misconduct. This shows that trust account fraud is a 
major crime, and it becomes a challenge to prevent it. 
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Money launderers ‘are not stereotype criminals. They are accountants, 
attorneys…and members of other legitimate professions’ (Clark, 2007). They do 
not appear to be criminals but professionals dealing with customers and in 
business partnerships in different fields. Further, it is noted that: solicitors 
probably contributed the greatest degree of professional support and facilitation to 
the activities of the launderers - such professionals would create offshore 
companies; arrange for the handling of large sums of money; sign cheques with 
power of attorney (Clark, 2007). Commonly known purposes for laundering are 
drug trafficking and terrorism. In both situations, money is turned over several 
times and generated quickly without any proof of transaction. In these types of 
crimes, cash is used as the main transaction method. The laundered money is used 
for other crimes while the criminals get a huge share of the proceeds in return. 
Successful money laundering turns criminal money into money that can be used 
for a profitable purpose. Along with major crime, money laundering also 
enhances activities such as corruption and bribery. Thus the ill effects of money 
laundering have economic and political implications.  
Money laundering is known to enable terrorist financing (IMF, 2007). In this 
case, terrorists tend to use illicit money, sourced from money laundering, for their 
work. It is observed that money laundering and the financing of terrorism use 
similar methods; in both the cases, the criminal makes illegitimate use of the 
finance sector (IMF, 2007). When a trust account is used as a means to operate 
money laundering activities, public money deposited in the trust may be utilised 
for terrorism or drug trafficking purposes. Hence, understanding the root cause of 
these problems and protecting trust accounts and information systems from an 
early stage is the challenge for information security professionals. Effective 
information security management procedures play a major role in combating 
these crimes. 
1.4 Information Security Management of Trust Accounts 
Rapid developments occurring in the field of information technology have 
benefited the management of trust accounts. Computers can make an accounting 
system more efficient with consequent benefits for solicitors and clients. Most 
trust accounts have been fully computerised since the mid-1980s. Currently, most 
law firms have a well-developed trust account system. The solicitors are required 
to obtain the Law Society’s approval to adopt such systems and a majority of 
lawyers have overwhelmingly embraced this technological advancement (Fourth 
Report on the Legal Profession: Solicitor’s Trust Accounts, 1984). Network and 
wireless technology permits easy communication through access to the computer 
systems from many locations. Whilst this is a benefit, it could also be a potential 
source of threat to the trust account. The Fourth Report on the Legal Profession 
(1984) clearly states that:  
In some ways computerised systems can be more vulnerable to fraudulent misuse 
and less capable of being subjected to effective independent scrutiny than some 
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other systems. This applies especially if, for example, the system does not retain a 
full history of entries on the records or allows such history to be readily falsified. 
Difficult problems arise also in relation to preventing unauthorised access to 
systems, and producing records in comprehensible form. 
 
The Law Society’s 1984 report clearly indicates the vulnerability of computerised 
trust accounts. However, in our literature review we have found very little data on 
the ways in which law firms manage the security of information systems, 
operating the trust accounts and the threats to these accounts. 
2. METHODOLOGY 
2.1 Research Aims 
As we have indicated, there is little data on the way law firms manage 
information security in a context where security breaches and fraud are well-
documented and fairly common. Despite many incidents involving serious 
security breaches of trust accounts, very limited information is currently available 
on the organisational environment and other possible aspects relevant to these 
accounts’ security.  
The study was conducted using a combination of qualitative and quantitative 
research methods known as ‘mixed method/triangulation’. Case study 
methodology was used to analyse and understand the issues in depth (qualitative). 
Preliminary case study findings were used as a baseline to create a survey 
(quantitative), which was conducted to study the extent to which these findings 
were prevalent among law practices. Hence, qualitative and quantitative methods 
were used to elicit rich data which aimed: 
? To explore the organisational environment prevailing within law 
practices, and the information security practices and procedures in use 
within law firms. 
? To study the extent to which solicitors were aware of computer crimes 
and their attitude towards the security of trust accounts. 
? To analyse security breaches if they have occurred within trust 
accounts in the past and the ways in which law firms have handled 
them. 
? To provide an opportunity for the employees of law firms to share 
their views in relation to the security management of trust accounts.  
We adopted a sequential procedure for our research. It began with the qualitative 
case study method, exploring case studies of law firms, interviewing both lawyers 
and their staff and then Trust Account Regulators. This was followed up with the 
quantitative survey method, in which questionnaires were mailed to all the law 
practices who maintain trust accounts in South Australia. 
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2.2 Data Collection Process 
2.2.1 Pilot Study 
A pilot study was conducted within three (n=3) law firms in South Australia in 
order to study the suitability of a survey questionnaire, and to establish the 
reliability and validity of the items included in it. 
2.2.2 Sample Selection 
Information presented here was based on data collected through face-to-face 
interviews with the staff in charge of the three law firms in the pilot study. These 
firms were selected on a purposive sampling basis using the following selection 
criteria:  
? The law firm is located within metropolitan Adelaide.   
? The law firm has been established for five or more years.  
? The law firm has five or more employees. 
2.2.3 Interview Protocol 
An interview protocol consisting of four sections was used to ensure the validity 
and reliability of the data collection process. The first section collected 
information pertaining to the law firm’s general background, such as the number 
of professional and administrative staff, and the respondents’ work experience. 
The second section focused on the organisation’s IT background, such as the 
number of computers in use, their accessibility, the role of IT personnel, and 
adaptation of security policies and standards. The third section inquired about the 
incidence of security breaches within the organisation and measures the 
organisation had taken to prevent future occurrences. The final section focused on 
trust accounts, incidents of mismanagement and respondents’ views on trust 
account vulnerability. Based on the pilot study experience, some of the questions 
had to be refined for use in the major study. 
2.3 Major Study: 10 Adelaide Lawyer Case Studies  
2.3.1 Sample Selection 
The Law Society of South Australia then invited firms to take part in the major 
study case study process. Ten firms responded positively to this letter. Thus, case 
studies were conducted with ten (n=10) law firms in South Australia. A semi-
structured interview protocol was used to ensure the validity and reliability of the 
data collection process.  
The first session with each law firm participant (n=10) lasted for 40-45 minutes. 
The researcher had to be an active listener and highly observant throughout the 
interview process. Some participants seemed very guarded while giving 
information; others seemed involved and cooperative throughout the interview. In 
some situations, with regard to technical questions, the researcher had to conduct 
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separate interviews with IT personnel. The researcher also had a chance to look at 
the trust account authorisation procedures and documentation.  
2.4 Major Study: 5 Adelaide Trust Regulators 
Five interviews (case studies) were conducted at the Law Society of South 
Australia. The main participants were five (n=5) trust account regulatory officers 
from the Professional Standards Section of the Law Society of South Australia. 
These regulatory officers are responsible for inspecting trust accounts in law firms 
on a time-to-time basis. The main interview content focused on the importance of 
trust accounts in a law firm, common types of breaches, different ways in which 
account systems are mishandled and information security measures to overcome 
these problems.  
Each interview lasted for 40–45 minutes, was voice recorded and later 
transformed into a text file. An interview guide was used to conduct these 
interviews. The items included in the interview guide collected information 
relating to:  
 
1. Background characteristics of the respondents 
2. Importance of trust accounts within the law practices  
3. Common breaches the respondents had come across and their 
observations relating to the details of these breaches  
4. Implications of the breaches for the trust account, law firm and the 
clients 
5. Impact of computerisation in the mishandling of trust accounts  
6. General suggestions for action to be taken to improve the overall 
security of the trust accounts. 
2.5 Major Study: The Survey 
2.5.1 Sample Selection 
All law firms located within South Australia who maintained a trust account and 
were members of the Law Society of South Australia were chosen as samples for 
the survey.  
2.5.2 Data Collection  
The survey—a self-administered questionnaire—was posted to all of these firms 
with a letter stating the purpose of the research and requesting their participation 
in the survey, and a consent form for participants to sign. A self-addressed, 
postage paid envelope was also included to enable easy return of the surveys. In 
all, the survey questionnaire was posted to 410 law firms within South Australia. 
Of the 410 questionnaires posted, seventy-six (n=76) valid questionnaires were 
returned. Posting the questionnaire seemed suitable and advantageous because it 
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reached a vast sample population and provided much needed anonymity for the 
data collection process. 
2.5.3 Data Analysis 
Case Studies 
Case study data analysis was carried out in four stages. As stated earlier, there 
were two sets of qualitative data; one set from law firms (n=10) and one set from 
trust account regulators (n=5). 
Stage 1: Audio Taping and Transcribing Interview Data 
Interviews were audio taped during the case studies. If there was any missing 
information, another call was made to  maintain the uniformity of the information 
collected. The audio files were transformed to text files (by transcription) as 
verbatim interviews. Each case was classified using identification numbers. 
Stage 2: Noting 
The textual data were again classified; responses that were seen as unique to 
building the study’s arguments were highlighted. In this review and noting 
process, important quotes were also written down.     
Stage 3: Grouping by Themes 
The data collected were grouped according to themes. For example, responses 
related to ‘organisational environment in the law firms’ were grouped together 
and formed into tables. The responses were carefully observed and noted down 
for comparison and contrast with similar themes. 
Stage 4: Creating Separate Tables of Comparison and Contrast 
The grouped tables were further divided into comparison and contrast information 
categories. Arguments were based on important and repeated quotes, which 
helped to draw inferences from the data. 
Analysis of Quantitative Data 
The quantitative data analysis was based on univariate analysis. In line with this 
process, the questionnaires gathered from the survey respondents were arranged 
in sequential number order. Responses were coded on a spreadsheet. Coded data 
were entered into an SPSS (version 16.0.1) data entry sheet to generate 
percentages and frequencies. This enabled the results of the study to be presented 
in the form of tables with percentages, graphs, pie charts and bar charts. Open-
ended questions were listed separately and grouped into small categories.  
3. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
3.1 Background Data  
Background data collected showed that the majority of respondents had more than 
five years experience of working in law firms. It was presumed they were well 
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versed in the procedures and operation of trust accounts. The respondents were 
mainly sole principals or partners of the law firms, followed by accounting staff. 
3.2 IT Resources  
The 10 case studies showed that together there were a minimum of nine and a 
maximum of 60 networked computers that were connected to the internet. The 
number of computers in each law firm ranged from 1-35 but only 86.8 percent 
were networked, and 97 percent had internet access. The majority of staff could 
view the computerised databases but only a few had the privilege of actually 
operating them. Accounting staff had more access privileges for the databases. 
However, the findings revealed that access controls to the databases were not 
strictly enforced. There was disparity among the law firms in assigning access 
control rights. This was considered a major information security threat. The 
findings about this issue are a warning to law firms to tighten their policies and 
also to suggest that the Law Society could impose specific guidelines on access 
control procedures to maintain uniformity among the firms. Both the case studies 
and the survey indicated that the internet was used for communicating with 
clients, research and banking purposes. The study cautions that the internet can be 
a means of software attack, which could be prevented by updating technology and 
regularly monitoring system security. 
3.3 Computer Security Environment 
It was observed in the case studies that half did not have an organisational 
information security policy. Those who were said to have such policies mentioned 
that the contents related to restriction and usage of computers and the internet. 
There seemed to be a lack of awareness about information security standards. The 
study stressed the need to educate law firms about the importance of information 
security policies and standards.  
Backup was another issue discussed. Backups were done regularly and kept both 
onsite and offsite. Only three cases out of 10 said they had contingency plans for 
business continuity without major disruption during any disastrous situation. 
Similarly, only three cases were said to have regular monitoring of their networks. 
This is a significant finding that stresses the need to have information security 
awareness programs in the law firms. 
It was noted that only 17 percent responded that they had an information security 
policy and 4 percent said policies were under construction. Those who had an 
information security policy said it was communicated via hard copy distribution 
or through intranet web references. It was striking to know that 92 percent of 
respondents did not follow any internationally accepted standards. However, it 
was encouraging to note that 51 percent monitored their systems to detect abuse.  
In both the survey and case study results, antivirus, firewalls and spyware were 
the most commonly reported security technologies. Reusable passwords and 
intrusion detection mechanisms were implemented in nearly one third of the law 
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firms. It was concluded that, along with the importance of security standards and 
policy, law firms need to educate staff in various IT security technology tools and 
controls to prevent computer abuse. 
3.4 Experience of Computer Crime  
From the data, it was understood that less than 25 percent of the law firms 
experienced any sort of computer crime/threat/attacks. Common attacks observed 
were virus attacks, spam and server hijacking, including computer theft. Some 
law firms had experienced the same type of attacks on several occasions. It was 
not clear whether these firms had taken appropriate measures to prevent further 
attacks. Financial gain and thrills were the main motivational factors observed by 
the respondents.  
3.5 Trust Accounts  
Case study results revealed that all the trust accounts in the participating firms 
were computerised. Access to trust account databases varied with the designation, 
role and responsibility of individuals within the law firm. Most employees were 
allowed to view the databases but restrictions applied to operating the accounts. 
The study suggests that the Law Society could impose some standardised 
regulation on accessing trust account databases. From the survey data, it was 
understood that only 57 percent of the firms were computerised. It is worrying to 
note that less than half of this percentage needed a password to log-in. Another 
important area of vulnerability explored was authorisation procedures on trust 
account cheques. Among the case studies, seven out of 10 needed only one 
signatory to authorise trust account cheques; the remaining three cases needed 
two partners’ signatures.  It was surprising to note that accounts managers had full 
authority to operate electronic transactions but were not reviewed by the firm’s 
partners. The survey revealed that 87 percent of firms needed only one signature 
and only 7 percent needed two peoples’ signatures. It was argued that if there 
were at least two signatories on the trust account authorisation, transparency 
exists and there is less chance for the signatory to misuse the trust money. It is 
suggested that the Law Society could impose some uniform rules on access 
control procedures and designate who could be signatories. 
In all 10 cases reviewed, it was felt that the trust account was vulnerable, and that 
‘internal measures needed to be tightened’ and ‘strict policies and procedures be 
put in place’. In the survey, the data indicated that 11 percent thought trust 
account data were altered occasionally due to human error, and when this 
happened they immediately notified the Law Society. Respondents made 
constructive suggestions to overcome this problem such as “to keep unauthorised 
users away from accessing the databases”, “principals to authorise trust account 
cheques” and “regular trust account reconciliation by the principals of the firms”. 
These suggestions would be useful feedback to law firms to improve their 
procedures.  
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3.6 Trust Account Regulators’ Viewpoints 
The five case studies carried out with trust account regulators revealed that 
practitioners do make accidental errors while entering trust data, and this can lead 
to major problems if not rectified immediately. Due to lack of resources, smaller 
firms have to empower one person with the trust account operation; separation of 
duties is not possible. In such situations, breach of trust was common. In other 
instances, the law firm principal signed a blank cheque and the bookkeeper filled 
in the wrong amount and used it for personal gain. In larger firms, due to work 
pressure, principals did not pay much attention to trust account matters, and 
administrative staff misused this situation. On other occasions, trust accounts 
were hacked by an external person. Hence, it was concluded that trust accounts 
have to be protected from all surrounding threats. 
Implications of trust account breaches were threefold: they affected the law firms, 
the law practitioners and the clients. The inefficiency of the law firms, if known to 
the public, could result in loss of reputation that could potentially end a practice. 
Law firms cannot underestimate the effects of a security breach and the 
accompanying loss of faith. Due to a bad experience, a client would switch to 
another law firm and the legal practitioner would be suspended from the practice 
if found guilty of breaching the trust account. On the client’s side, the scenario 
could be worse if they were not able to access the money from the trust account 
when needed, or if they lost their own money. The breach could also lead to 
severe economic, social and medical impact on the client.  
The respondents felt that there may not be any direct association of computers in 
these crimes; however this would be the case when trust accounts become 
computerised or when electronic conveyancing is introduced. 
Case study and survey data emphasised that a trust account is vulnerable to 
internal and external threats if adequate security measures are not taken. Trust 
account regulators mentioned that instances of breaches have a negative impact 
on clients, law firms and legal practitioners.  
4. CONCLUSION 
The findings from multiple data sources reveal the urgent need to adopt 
administrative and technological security controls, and information security 
policies and procedures. The cooperation of all staff from management level 
downwards is needed to communicate these policies. These issues were 
highlighted by the respondents in their suggestions. One overall finding is the fact 
that law firms were not familiar with the up to-date technology available to 
combat computer crime. Lack of monitoring of computer systems and inadequate 
access control to corporate databases were the main concerns in safeguarding the 
data. The literature review in section 1 expressed the importance of backup, data 
monitoring and business continuity plans to restore the business in the event of 
any disaster.  It was concluded that awareness of computer crime among the law 
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firms was not prominent. Hence, security awareness training for the law firms 
would play a major role in preparing for better security practices. 
Trust account authorisation procedure from the case study and survey noted that 
there is not a standardised rule about the nomination of and number of signatories 
for trust account cheques. In some cases, electronic money transactions in trust 
accounts were carried out by the administrative staff. These procedures need to be 
standardised in all the law firms with the help of the Law Society of South 
Australia.  According to the suggestions received from the respondents, there are 
a few dubious areas that are prominent in trust account operations which have to 
be addressed by policy makers.  
Lack of resources in smaller firms places too much responsibility on one person. 
In such situations, misusing power and authority for personal gain becomes very 
common. Management controls such as specifying the duties of each individual 
and segregation of power would minimise such mishandlings.  
Trust account fraud is not limited to the individual. There are possibilities of using 
trust account frauds in other major crimes such as money laundering, drug 
trafficking and the financing of terrorist organisations. Therefore, protecting trust 
accounts from any fraud needs to be addressed through effective security 
management.  
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